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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     _______________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
         This appeal from a criminal conviction challenges the 
district court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress 
physical evidence seized by the police.  The question we must 
decide is whether an anonymous tip that contains only information 
readily observable at the time the tip is made may supply 
reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop in the absence of police 
observations of any suspicious conduct.  We conclude that it may 
not.  We will therefore reverse the judgment of the district 
court.   
   
                                I. 
         On the evening of September 29, 1994, a Philadelphia 
Police Department 911 operator received an anonymous call stating 
that a heavy-set, black male wearing dark green pants, a white 
hooded sweatshirt, and a brown leather jacket was selling drugs 
on the 2100 block of Chelten Avenue.  The 911 operator had no 
information as to the reliability of the caller or the source of 
this information.   
         At approximately 7:18 p.m., the informer's tip was 
relayed over the police radio.  Officers Steven Nathan and Steven 
Hellmuth, who were patrolling in a marked police Ford Bronco, 
responded.  About thirty to forty seconds after receiving the 
call, they arrived at the 2100 block of Chelten and saw a man 
meeting the tipster's description standing on the corner.  
According to the police officers, that corner was a known "hot 
spot" where drugs were sold to passing motorists.  Officer Nathan 
and the man, later to be identified as the defendant, Lester 
Roberson, made eye contact.  According to Nathan, the defendant 
then walked "casually" over to a car parked facing the wrong way 
on Chelten Avenue and leaned in as if to speak with the vehicle's 
occupants.  The police observed no indicia of drug activity.     
         At this point, the officers exited their Bronco, with 
guns drawn, and ordered the defendant away from the parked car.  
As they approached him, they observed the butt of a gun 
protruding from his pants.  They patted him down, and seized from 
his person a 9mm semi-automatic pistol with 13 rounds of 
ammunition, two plastic bags containing numerous packets of 
cocaine, a pill bottle containing 47 valium pills, a half-full 
bottle of cough syrup, and $319 in U.S. currency.  The defendant 
was placed under arrest, and was subsequently indicted for 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 
U.S.C.  922(g)(1).      
         Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized by the 
police.  He argued that the officers did not have reasonable 
suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity and that 
their stop was, therefore, in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  The government countered 
that Officers Nathan and Hellmuth saw Roberson's gun before 
exiting their vehicle.  Because possession of a firearm is a 
crime, the officers had, in the government's submission, probable 
cause for an arrest, and, a fortiori, reasonable suspicion for a 
Terry stop.  
         After an evidentiary hearing, the district court 
rejected the government's contention, finding that the officers 
did not observe the "defendant's gun [until] some time after they 
exited their vehicle with their weapons in hand," and therefore 
that they did not have probable cause for the seizure.  United 
States v. Roberson, No. 95-69, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 
1995).  However, according to the court, lack of probable cause 
was not fatal to the government's case because the officers' 
conduct in leaving their vehicle with their guns drawn was not an 
arrest for which probable cause was necessary.  Id. at 4-6.  
These aspects of the district court's ruling are not challenged 
on appeal.               
         The district court turned next to the Terry issue and 
reasoned that the officers' arrival on the scene "less than one 
minute after receiving the radio dispatch" and their 
identification of the "defendant as a clear match to the radio 
call's detailed description of the suspect" constituted 
reasonable suspicion for their stop.  Id. at 6-7.  The court also 
noted that "the eye contact that occurred between the defendant 
and the officers and the defendant's interaction with the people 
in the car" bolstered the officers' suspicion.  Id. at 7.  It 
thus denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.  The 
case proceeded to a jury trial and, after conviction, the 
defendant was sentenced to 240 months in jail.  The principal 
question presented on appeal is the propriety of the district 
court's suppression ruling.  Although its factual findings must 
be reviewed for clear error, we review the district court's 
finding of reasonable suspicion de novo.  See Ornelas v. United 
States, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1662-63 (1996).   
                                  
                               II. 
                                A. 
         In Terry, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement 
officers have the authority under the Fourth Amendment to stop 
and temporarily detain citizens short of an arrest, and that such 
a stop is justified by less than the probable cause necessary for 
an arrest.  392 U.S. at 25-27.  Under Terry, a police officer may 
detain and investigate citizens when he or she has a reasonable 
suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot."  Id. at 30.  In 
this case, we must determine whether officers Nathan and Hellmuth 
had such reasonable suspicion.  
         There is a well developed Supreme Court jurisprudence 
as to whether an informant's tip can provide either probable 
cause for an arrest or reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop.  
The Supreme Court initially set forth a two-pronged approach for 
determining whether an informant's tip established probable 
cause.  See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 411, 416 (1969); 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).  Under those cases, 
to be credible, an informant's tip had to indicate both the basis 
for the informant's knowledge as well as facts sufficient to 
establish his veracity or reliability.   
         In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Court, 
again dealing with probable cause, abandoned this two-pronged 
test in favor of a totality of the circumstances approach for 
evaluating an anonymous tip.  It wrote: 
         Moreover, the "two-pronged test" directs 
         analysis into two largely independent 
         channels -- the informant's "veracity" or 
         "reliability" and his "basis of knowledge."  
         There are persuasive arguments against 
         according these two elements such independent 
         status.  Instead, they are better understood 
         as relevant considerations in the totality- 
         of-the-circumstances analysis that 
         traditionally has guided probable-cause 
         determinations:  a deficiency in one may be 
         compensated for, in determining the overall 
         reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as 
         to the other, or by some other indicia of 
         reliability.   
Id. at 233.  (citations omitted).  In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 
325 (1990), the Court adopted the totality of the circumstances 
test to determine whether an anonymous tip could provide 
reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop.  In concluding that the 
Gates tip provided probable cause and the White tip provided 
reasonable suspicion, the Court stressed two factors: (1) an 
officer's ability to corroborate significant aspects of the tip, 
and (2) the tip's ability to predict future events.        
         Returning to Gates, there the Bloomingdale Police 
Department had received an anonymous letter stating that Lance 
and Sue Gates were Illinois drug dealers and that Mrs. Gates 
would drive the family car to Florida on May 3, leave the car to 
be loaded with drugs, and fly home.  Several days later, 
according to the letter, Mr. Gates would fly to Florida and drive 
the car -- now packed with over $100,000 worth of drugs -- home 
to Bloomingdale.  The letter also represented that the Gateses 
had over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement.  Id. at 225.  
An Illinois detective learned that Mr. Gates had made a 
reservation to fly to Florida on May 5.  Id. at 225-26.  The Drug 
Enforcement Administration set up surveillance and observed Mr. 
Gates deplane in West Palm Beach, go to a hotel room registered 
to his wife, leave that room the next morning with an 
unidentified woman, enter a car with Illinois license plates 
registered to him, and drive back to Illinois.  Id. at 226.   
         The detective signed an affidavit setting forth these 
facts and submitted it, together with the anonymous letter, to 
the local court.  The magistrate determined that there was 
probable cause and issued a search warrant for the Gateses' 
residence and automobile.  Id.  The Illinois Supreme Court found 
that no probable cause existed, but the U.S. Supreme Court 
reversed.   
         First, according to the Court, the facts obtained from 
the investigation, standing alone, suggested that the Gateses 
were involved in drug trafficking.  Florida is a well-known drug 
source, and Gates' quick overnight stay was suggestive of a drug 
run.  Id. at 243.  Second, investigators were able to verify 
numerous details including that the Gateses' car would be in 
Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to Florida in the next day or 
so, and that he would drive the car back towards Illinois.  Id. 
at 244.  Stressing the value of corroboration, the court 
concluded that because the informant had been right about these 
facts, his other assertions about illegal activity were also 
probably true.  Id.  Furthermore, the letter "contained a range 
of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and 
conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions 
of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted."  Id. at 245.  
Emphasizing the insider quality of predictive information, the 
Court concluded that if the informant "had access to accurate 
information of this type, a magistrate could properly concluded 
that it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable 
information of the Gateses' alleged illegal activities."  Id.  
         Building on Gates in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 
(1990), the Court considered whether an anonymous informant's tip 
would provide reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop -- the 
situation present in this case.  In that case, the Montgomery 
police department received an anonymous telephone call at 3:00 
p.m. that: 
         Vanessa White would be leaving 235-C Lynwood 
         Terrace Apartments at a particular time in a 
         brown Plymouth station wagon with the right 
         taillight lens broken, that she would be 
         going to Dobey's Motel, and that she would be 
         in possession of about an ounce of cocaine 
         inside a brown attache case. 
 
Id. at 327.  The police set up surveillance outside the Lynwood 
Terrace Apartments.  They saw a brown Plymouth station wagon with 
a broken taillight and observed a woman leave the 235 building 
empty-handed and enter the station wagon.  The officers followed 
the vehicle as it drove the most direct route to Dobey's Motel.  
When the car reached the Highway on which the motel was located, 
the police stopped the vehicle (at approximately 4:18 p.m.), and 
White granted them permission to search the car for cocaine.  
Discovering marijuana in a brown attache case in the car, they 
placed White under arrest.  At the police station, the officers 
found cocaine in White's purse.  Id. 
         The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held that the 
officers did not have reasonable suspicion under Terry, and 
reversed her conviction.  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  Id. 
at 328.  The Court applied the totality of the circumstances 
approach of Gates, and concluded that it must review both the 
quantity and quality of information provided by the tip.  Id. at 
330.  In doing so, the Court emphasized that, in the Terrycontext, this 
information need only give rise to a lower level of 
suspicion.  Id. ("'We have held that probable cause means "a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found," and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is 
obviously less demanding than for probable cause.'") (citingUnited States 
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989)) (citations omitted).  
         The Court went on to hold that while "[t]he tip was not 
as detailed, and the corroboration was not as complete, as in 
Gates," the tip provided appropriate grounds for the stop because 
the "required degree of suspicion was likewise not as high."  Id. 
at 329, 332.  Importantly, the officers were able to corroborate 
numerous details supplied by the tipster; namely that a woman 
left the 235 building, got into the car described by the caller, 
traveled the most direct route to the motel, and that this all 
happened in the time frame predicted by the informant.  Id. at 
331.  Referencing Gates, the Court concluded that because the 
tipster had been right about these things, "he is probably right 
about other facts that he has alleged, including the claim that 
the object of the tip is engaged in criminal activity."  Id. at 
331-32.   
         As in Gates, the Court placed great emphasis on the 
tip's predictive value.  It wrote: 
         We think it also important that, as in Gates, 
         "the anonymous [tip] contained a range of 
         details relating not just to easily obtained 
         facts and conditions existing at the time of 
         the tip, but to future actions of third 
         parties ordinarily not easily predicted."  
         The fact that the officers found a car 
         precisely matching the caller's description 
         in front of the 235 building is an example of 
         the former.  Anyone could have "predicted" 
         that fact because it was a condition 
         presumably existing at the time of the call.  
         What was important was the caller's ability 
         to predict respondent's future behavior, 
         because it demonstrated inside information -- 
         a special familiarity with the respondent's 
         affairs. . . . Because only a small number of 
         people are generally privy to an individual's 
         itinerary, it is reasonable for police to 
         believe that a person with access to such 
         information is likely to also have access to 
         reliable information about that individual's 
         illegal activities. 
Id. at 332.  (citations omitted) (emphasis added).   Thus, the 
court concluded that while it was a "close call," this predictive 
anonymous tip, as corroborated, "exhibited sufficient indicia of 
reliability to justify the investigatory stop of [White's] car."  
Id. (emphasis added).           
                                B. 
         Against this legal landscape, we must determine whether 
the anonymous tip indicating that a heavy-set, black man wearing 
green pants, a brown leather jacket, and a white hooded 
sweatshirt was selling drugs on the 2100 block of Chelten Avenue 
-- together with the subsequent observations by officers Nathan 
and Hellmuth -- provided reasonable suspicion under Alabama v. 
White for an investigative stop.  We conclude that it does not.  
         As we have noted, in assessing reasonable suspicion for 
a stop pursuant to an anonymous tip, Alabama v. White stressed 
corroboration and predictiveness.  In the instant situation, it 
is no doubt true that the officers were able to corroborate most 
of the tipster's information.  But to use the Court's language, 
"Anyone could have 'predicted'" the facts contained in the tip 
because they were "condition[s] presumably existing at the time 
of the call."  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 332.  Indeed, the 
caller could have been looking out his window at a heavy-set 
black man in green pants, brown leather jacket, and white hooded 
sweat shirt at the time of his 911 call.   
         By contrast, the tipster in Illinois v. Gates indicated 
that on a certain date Mrs. Gates would drive the family car to 
Florida, that Mr. Gates would fly to Florida several days 
thereafter, meet the car, and drive it back to Illinois.  462 
U.S. at 225.  This type of information is not readily known or 
observable to members of the public.  Likewise, in Alabama v. 
White, the informant predicted that White would shortly leave a 
particular building, enter a described car, and drive a certain 
route.  496 U.S. at 327.  Because the tipster had accurate 
information about Ms. White's upcoming itinerary, details not 
known to the general public, it was reasonable for the officers 
to conclude that the tipster had accurate information about Ms. 
White's illegal activities.  Id. at 332.   
         The tip in the case at bar contained no "details of 
future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted."  
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (quoting Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 (1983)).  Thus, no future actions could 
be corroborated, and an important basis for forming reasonable 
suspicion was absent.  Moreover, because they were dealing with 
an anonymous and bare-bones tip, the police had no basis for 
assessing either the reliability of the informant or the grounds 
on which the informant believed that a crime was being committed 
-- the two Aguilar/Spinelli prongs, which were not abandoned in 
Illinois v. Gates but were made important ingredients in the 
"totality."  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232-233.   
         These omissions probably would not have invalidated the 
stop, if, after corroborating readily observable facts, the 
police officers had noticed unusual or suspicious conduct on 
Roberson's part.  But they did not.  Cf. United States v. 
Clipper, 973 F.2d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("While it is true 
that the Court said, in [Alabama v. White], that the police's 
ability to corroborate the informant's predictions was important, 
Alabama v. White does not establish a categorical rule 
conditioning a Terry stop (when police are acting on an anonymous 
tip) on the corroboration of predictive information."), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 1070 (1993).  After their arrival on Chelten 
Avenue, the police first saw the defendant standing on the 
corner, and they then observed him walk to a car parked across 
the street and lean in as if to talk to the vehicle's 
occupant(s).  None of this was unusual.  Officer Nathan testified 
that it was normal for residents of that neighborhood to stand on 
the corner.  App. at 51a ("[T]he information that we received was 
he was on the corner, which was no great big deal, because guess 
what that's where everybody hangs up there is on the corner.").   
         Furthermore, defendant's walk to the car did not 
indicate that he was about to engage in drug transactions.  
First, according to Nathan's own testimony, the defendant walked 
"casually" to the car -- behavior that does not indicate criminal 
activity.  Second, as the government admits in its brief, because 
the defendant had already seen the marked police car, it would be 
"highly unlikely that he would engage in drug transactions at 
that moment."  Brief at 9.  Indeed, common sense indicates that 
the vehicle's occupants were not likely to purchase drugs from 
the defendant at that time.  According to the Government, drugs 
are purchased on Chelten Avenue by passing motorists, who drive 
to "hot corners," make their purchases, and drive quickly away.  
The car the defendant approached was parked across the street 
from the defendant, facing the wrong way, a posture inconsistent 
with a quick exit and the alleged style of drug transactions in 
this neighborhood.     
         All that the Government is left with then is the fact 
that the defendant was apprehended on a "hot corner."  This is 
not enough.  The 2100 block of Chelten Avenue is a residential 
neighborhood.  We simply cannot accept the Government's position 
that any resident of (or visitor to) that neighborhood who, 
without otherwise engendering suspicion, is unlucky enough to be 
the subject of a non-predictive anonymous tip, is subject to a 
Terry stop simply because the neighborhood is known for narcotics 
sales.  Even Alabama v. White was referred to by the Supreme 
Court as a "close call," 496 U.S. at 332.  The circumstances of 
this case are far less compelling. 
         Refusing to stretch Alabama v. White any further, we 
hold that the police do not have reasonable suspicion for an 
investigative stop when, as here, they receive a fleshless 
anonymous tip of drug-dealing that provides only readily 
observable information, and they themselves observe no suspicious 
behavior.  To hold otherwise would work too great an intrusion on 
the Fourth Amendment liberties, for any citizen could be subject 
to police detention pursuant to an anonymous phone call 
describing his or her present location and appearance and 
representing that he or she was selling drugs.  Indeed anyone of 
us could face significant intrusion on the say-so of an anonymous 
prankster, rival, or misinformed individual.  This, we believe, 
would be unreasonable.  
 
         We note that the government was not powerless to act on 
the non-predictive, anonymous tip they received.  The officers 
could have set up surveillance of the defendant.  See United 
States v. Clipper, 973 F.2d at 951 ("If there is any doubt about 
the reliability of an anonymous tip in [a drug case], the police 
can limit their response to surveillance or engage in 'controlled 
buys.'").  If the officers then observed any suspicious behavior 
or if they had observed suspicious behavior as they approached 
the defendant in this case, they would have had appropriate cause 
to stop -- and perhaps even arrest -- him.  This, however, they 
did not do.  In the absence of any observations of suspicious 
conduct or the corroboration of information from which the police 
could reasonably conclude that the anonymous tipster's allegation 
of criminal activity was reliable, we must conclude that there 
was no reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant.    
 
                               III. 
         For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the 
district court will be reversed.   
